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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Richard G. Silliman*
Threat of Lie-Detector Test Not "Undue Influence" in Obtaining Con-
fession-In Pinter v. State, 34 So. (2d) 723 (Miss. 1948), the unique
question was raised whether the threat of a lie-detector test which
"seared" the accused into a confession was undue duress sufficient to
render the confession incompetent. The court ruled the confession com-
petent, saying, "A desire to anticipate by voluntary disclosure, the sup-
posed revelations of a lie-detector has its origin in the mind and con-
science of the defendant, and is not an undue influence."
The facts of the Pinter case, as stated by the court, indicate, however,
that there was not a direct threat of a lie-detector test, but that it was
merely mentioned in a conversation among the officers en route to thejail. Thus the case does not present the narrower question of whether
such a confession is admissible where the suspect is actually threatened
with the test. Since it is fairly'clear that a suspect cannot be compelled
to submit to such a test, the obtaining of a confession in this fashion
might be said to be trickery. The use of tricks in obtaining confessions,
so long as the results may be deemed "trustworthy" has long been ap-
proved. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d. ed. 1940) §841. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has ruled admissible a confession obtained in a manner
more closely constituting a threat than the present case. Commonwealth
v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.(2d) 353 (1939). But see the case of People
v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E. (2d) 336 (1946), in which the Illinois Su-
preme Court held inadmissible a confession obtained from a subject as
she was about to be given a lie-detector test which she had previously
refused to take, but to which she had been ordered to submit by the
prosecuting attorney and police investigators. (For a discussion of other
recent confession cases, see page 202 of this Journal.)
Photographic Identification of Assailant Permitted Even Though As-
sailant is Present in Court-In Brown v. State, 210 S.W. (2d) 670 (Tenn.
1948), the defendant was convicted of assaulting an eight year old girl.
Immediately following the incident, the girl was shown a photograph of
the defendant, and she positively identified him as her assailant. At the
trial, on direct examination the girl was offered a group of photographs
and asked to select those of the man who assaulted her. She picked out
two of the defendant. On direct examination she was not asked whether
the defendant (who was present in the courtroom) was the man who at-
tacked her. On cross-examination this question was asked of her and
she stated "No'm, that is not him."
The defendant urged on appeal that, on the basis of the best evidence
rule, the photographs ought not to have been admitted in evidence since
he himself was present during the trial. The court dismissed his argu-
ment by stating that the best evidence rule applies only to documents or
things bearing writing.
Scott, in his treatise on Photographic Evidence (1942) §652, states
that where the party involved is present in the courtroom, and no sub-
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,.tantial change in his appearance has taken place. the photographs
should not be admitted in evidence. (See e.g. Farina. v. Commonwealth,
278 S.W. 1097, 212 Ky. 303 (1926) which follows Scott and is an oppo-
site holding to that in the present ease.)
Powder Burn Experiments Made With Different Type Powder Held
Competent-The recent case of State v. Phillips, 46 S.E. (2d) 720 (N.C.,
1948), presented the problem of the admissibility in evidence of experi-
ments relating to powder burns made with the pistol from which a fatal
shot had been fired.
According to accepted practice. the distance of firing can be ascertained
accurately by a comparison of the powder burn area on a body with the
experimental burn areas made by firing the weapon at varying ranges
into targets such as cardboard, etc. In the instant case, involving a
prosecution for murder, the principal defense was that defendant's wife
had committed suicide, and the defendant testified on cross-examination
that the pistol was "probably 6 inches" from her arm when it went off.
The evidence disclosed, however, that there were no powder burns on her
clothing or body. Experiments were made, therefore, by firing the pistol
into targets covered by white cheesecloth of the same thickness as her
garment and yielded powder burns up to 18 inches.
The defendant's objection to the experimental evidence on the ground
that the experiments were not conducted under substantially similar cir-
cumstances as in the fatal shooting itself, since the same type of cartridge
was not used in the experiment. The fatal shot was fired from a German
made cartridge, which contained a special powder designed to reduce
the flash. One of the officers who made the experiment testified on cross-
examination that the amount and type of powder would vary only the
discoloration "but would have nothing to do with what we call powder
burns." The court accepted the expert's statement as meeting the re-
quirement of "substantial similarity," and affirmed the conviction. (See
comment on the subject of experimental evidence in (1940) 34 Ill. L.
Rev. 206.)
Signature on Appearance Bond Held Admissible for Comparison of
Handwriting-Reinivy r. United States, 167 F. (2d) 362 (C.C.A. 5th,
3948) presents a situation where the signature of the defendant as.written
on an appearance bond was admitted for purposes of comparison with
letters allegedly signed by him in perpetrating a mail fraud. On appeal.
the defendant urged (1) that the admission of the appearance bond did
not satisfy the requirements of the act of Feb. 26, 1913, 37 Stat. 683 (28
U.S.C.A. §638) on the basis that it was not admitted or proved to be his
handwriting; and (2) that in exacting his signature on the bond, the
officers compelled him to testify against himself since the bond was later
used to prove his handwriting.
The Court of Appeals stated that the Act of 1913 is merely an enlarge-
ment of the common law on the subject, and points out that at common
law, any pleading or document which forms a part of the record is com-
petent for purposes of comparison. The court also cites Mloore v. United
States, 91 U.S. 270 (1875) as holding that documents admitted in evi-
dence for other purposes are competent as a basis for comparison. As to
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the duress argument, the court held that lawful arrest is not duress and
that he was in no way compelled to sign the document, since he was
privileged to have another person sign for him or even place only his
mark on it. "There was nothing like an unlawfully extorted confession,"
the court said.
Federal Courts Accept Blood Tests as Evidence in Homicide Cases-
In Kemp v. The Government of the Canal Zone, 167 F. (2d) 938 (C.C.A.
5th, 1948), a federal court for the first time admitted in evidence a
showing by expert testimony that blood stains on the clothing of the
accused were of the same blood type as that of the victim and of a differ-
ent type from that of the accused. The court recognized that the blood
types do not give a positive identification, but held that the testimony
was of some weight and should go to the jury, particularly since the de-
fendant had stated that all of the blood stains on his clothing were of
his own blood. (For additional information upon this issue, see Dicker-
son, Admissibility of Blood Tests to Show Possibility of Source (1947)
37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 300.)
Tissues Taken from Fingernails Held Proper Evidence in Rape Case-In
Coleman v. State, 209 S.W. (2d) 925 (Tex., 1948), the defendant, who
was convicted of rape, urged that the scraping of his fingernails for
samples of tissue to compare with the tissue of the prosecutrix amounted
to forcing him to testify against himself. The court ruled that scraping
his fingernails was not different from the taking of any other item of
evidence from the person of the defendant, and was, therefore, a per-
fectly proper procedure.
Return of Police Records to Acquitted Party Refused-State ex rel Ma-
vity v. Tyndall, 74 N.E. (2d) 914 (Ind. 1947) involves a suit by an ac-
quitted defendant in a criminal trial to have the photographs, finger-
prints, and measurements taken by police returned to him. In a previous
case involving the same parties, 66 N.E. (2d) 755 (Ind., 1946), the court
awarded an injunction prohibiting the exhibition of his photograph in
a "rogue's gallery" but did not award the return of the police records.
In his amended complaint plaintiff dropped all allegations concerning the
exhibition and sought the return of the records exclusively. His case
relied mainly on a broad constitutional argument that a man's property
may not be taken without due process of law and that the state may take
it only after just compensation has been paid.
The court in the second appeal held that individual liberties are always
subject to the power of the State to act in order to protect the health
and welfare of its citizens, and the limits of what may be done by the
State in this direction are constantly expanding "as our society grows
and becomes more complex." It found that the keeping of records is a
proper public function and denied the appeal. (For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the problems presented by this case see comment by Leighton.
Protection of Innocent Persons Against Misuse by Police Authorities of
Photographs and Fingerprints (1947) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 519.)
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